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Single-Machine Binding: Each activation key is bound to one specific computer. You cannot use the same key on multiple machines simultaneously.
| Threat | Potential Impact | Mitigation in GAK‑T | |--------|------------------|---------------------| | Spoofing (fake client) | Unauthorized activation | Mutual TLS + device fingerprint | | Tampering (key modification) | License bypass | AES‑GCM integrity, HMAC verification | | Repudiation (user denies activation) | Legal ambiguity | Server logs with signed timestamps | | Information Disclosure (key leakage) | Key reuse | One‑time nonce per activation, short‑term offline validity | | Denial of Service (activation flooding) | Service outage | Rate‑limiting, IP reputation checks | | Elevation of Privilege (privileged API abuse) | Full license unlock | Role‑based API tokens, least‑privilege design | giglad activation key top
Transferring Licenses: To move your license to a new machine, you must first deactivate it on the current computer and then activate it on the new one. Single-Machine Binding : Each activation key is bound
5.3. Results
| Metric | Mean ± SD | Observation | |--------|-----------|-------------| | Offline brute‑force attempts | 0 successful keys (0 % success) | Expected ≥ 128‑bit security | | Online activation latency | 3.2 ± 0.9 s | Dominated by TLS handshake | | Offline activation latency | 0.4 ± 0.1 s | Local decryption only | | CPU usage (peak) | 7 % (single core) | Negligible impact on normal workflow | | Memory consumption | 12 MB | Fits within typical application footprint | | Usability score | 4.6 ± 0.3 | Users reported “smooth” experience | | Threat | Potential Impact | Mitigation in